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Raenia,, Astika Saria
a University
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Abstract
This article aims to examine the challenges of designing individual’s income tax systems in general and
particularly to observe taxpayers’ behaviour in developing countries. This study used case study approach
to gain in depth understanding type of taxpayers’ attitude towards personal income tax systems. Based on
the analyses, tax behaviour, which comprises the perception of fairness and motivation to comply, attracts
urgent challenges in designing effective tax on personal income in every country and mainly underdeveloped
countries. Every human being in each country has their social pattern towards tax policy. When the individual
perception of fairness is significant, it will harmonise the ’client and service approach’ between taxpayers and
governments. This condition would influence tax morale of individuals to comply with the policy and achieve
high compliance rate. Therefore, it has argued that personal view of fairness and their motivation to comply
with tax systems are becoming vital challenges in designing the tax policy on individual income.
Keywords: Personal Income Tax; Fairness; Tax Moral

Abstrak
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menginvestigasi tantangan-tantangan yang dihadapi dalam merancang sistem
perpajakan untuk wajib pajak orang pribadi dan secara khusus menganalisa perilaku wajib pajak di
negara-negara berkembang. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan studi literatur untuk mendapatkan
secara mendalam jenis perilaku wajib pajak penghasilan orang pribadi. Berdasarkan hasil analisis terkait
perilaku pajak, yang terdiri dari persepsi keadilan dan motivasi untuk mematuhi memberikan tantangan
tersendiri dalam merancang pajak yang berlaku atas penghasilan pribadi di setiap negara dan terutama
negara-negara berkembang. Setiap individu memiliki pola yang berbeda ketika berinteraksi terhadap
kebijakan pajak. Ketika persepsi individu terhadap keadilan adalah signifikan, hal itu akan menyelaraskan
pendekatan ’client and service’ antara pembayar pajak dan pemerintah. Kondisi ini akan memengaruhi
semangat individu untuk mematuhi kebijakan dan mencapai tingkat kepatuhan yang tinggi. Oleh karena itu,
asumsi bahwa pandangan individu terhadap keadilan dan motivasi untuk mematuhi sistem pajak menjadi
tantangan penting dalam merancang kebijakan terhadap wajib pajak orang pribadi.
Kata kunci: Pajak Penghasilan Orang Pribadi; Prinsip Keadilan; Moral Wajib Pajak
JEL classifications: E63

1. Introduction
A process of designing fiscal policy is a crucial and
problematic task. Tax system, especially personal
income tax, plays an essential role as a central
source for public spending. It also intervenes with
 Corresponding Address: Gedung L2 Lantai 1 Kampus
Sekaran Gunungpati 50299. E-mail: xxr472@alumni.bham.ac.
uk.

the public’s attitude towards it. In broad terms, it is
complicated to develop a powerful tax system that
fits all. Each country is unique in a way that they
have their characteristics, their major sources of income and their citizens’ attitudes toward tax. There
are many aspects to be considered by tax authorities in creating an adequate tax system, particularly
on personal income tax. Miller & Oats (2016) define
personal income tax as a levy. It describes individual earnings (wages, rental or other proceeds) from
business revenues. As the fiscal policy instrument,
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the functions of taxation are classified in three features; the provision of public goods, the distribution
of resources and economic stabilisation. Likewise,
Bird & Zolt (2005) analysed, the main objectives of
taxation are to increase government revenue and to
distribute income and wealth. However, formulating
the best practice to fit all purposes seems to be a
challenging goal.
When designing tax system, Smith (1976) points out
that there are four characteristics to be considered;
equity, certainty, convenience to pay and efficiency.
These fundamentals are needed in every particular
area when designing a tax system. There are some
essential elements to be considered such as types
of income sources, subject to tax rules, the structure
of tax rate, how to allocate tax burden and the effect
on taxpayer behaviour (Lymer & Oat 2015). Many
alternatives have been tried to achieve an efficient
design of personal income tax by changing the best
practice in determining tax rate, tax base and other
elements.
OECD (2012) identified that different types of tax
rates’ models, such as progressive, flat or regressive tax rate can be utilised as a tool in fiscal redistribution policy to reduce income inequality in all
countries. In the USA for example, the government
has reduced the level of tax rate while the dispersion of income tends to be rapidly widening in the
few decades. Gale, Kearney & Orszag (2015) examined that the change of individual’s income tax rate
in the scenario increases around 5%–10% in the
USA and only influenced less that 0.01 of the Gini
coefficient. It is also revealed that enacting a higher
income tax on higher taxable income in society to
trade-off decreasing number on low-income society
would not affect the significant impact on the disparity between them. Le Grand (1989) examines that
the failure of inequality can be explained by individual’s way of thinking about social and economic
equality. Even though the tax is a compulsory contribution, everyone has the option whether to comply
or not to comply with their tax liability.
Moreover, from a perspective of tax based, OECD
(2016) reported that the majority of OECD countries rely heavily on personal income tax which accounted for an average of 8.77% of GDP. While
Denmark had the highest dependent up to 27.67%
of GDP in 2014, the majority of developing countries rely less on personal income. As the example
tax burden proportion of GDP for some develop-
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ing countries (The Heritage Foundation 2016) such
as Brazil (33.4%), Russia (34.8%), India (16.7%),
Indonesia (11.8%) and China (19.4%) while the
average tax revenue as a percentage of GDP as
follows.
At the same time, there has been much discussion
whether a tax on personal income is a failure to
combat income inequality, which has diverged in
the last few decades. Recent evidence shows that
inequality of wealth has been effected not only in
OECD countries such as the USA but also in more
emerging economy countries such as Indonesia,
Russia and China (OECD 2015). However, the situation is not regularly the same, because Norway for
example, it relies heavily on personal income tax
as well as having great equality of revenue. It even
has become a country with the highest HDI for a
few years.
It can be analysed that personal income tax has
not meet the main objective to alleviate inequality
in underdeveloped countries since it seems to be
widening rapidly. In this way, there will be less distribution among the high level of earnings to the lower
level of revenue through tax systems. While the
richest people tend to explore more resources from
the country and get more benefits in comparison to
poorer people. In Indonesia, for example, tax on personal income, particularly dividend and wages, is
likely to attract arbitrage. Dividend income is taxed
around 10% while a tax on salaries is taxed between 5%–30% (PwC 2016). In this scheme, there
is an opportunity for the highest level of income to
substitute their wages to dividends income since
the tax on dividend only about 10%.
Also an opportunity not to comply with regulation
because of inadequate monitoring from tax authorities. As a consequence, income on personal tax of
95% was contributed by wages and 5% from other
sources of individual income. Interestingly, Oxfam
(2016) quotes that Warren Buffet, the wealthiest
people said that his tax payment is lower than his
secretary or his cleaner. This issue also has been
examined last few decades. Braithwaite (2003) identifies that around three-quarters of Australians perceived that CEO of prominent companies did not
pay the fair tax of their shares. It can be analysed
that tax on individual earning on salary, frequently
imposed on a source is likely to provide high compliance rate. While owners of business, self-employed
and entrepreneurs are bound to be reluctant to pay
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Table 1: Mean Tax Revenue of Proportion of GDP
Country category
Low Income Countries
Lower Middle Income Countries
Upper Middle Income Countries
High Income Countries / OECD Members

Average Tax Revenue (% of GDP)
13.0
17.7
20.7
35.4

Source: International Development Committee (2012)

the tax. The majority of the people believe that deducting their income to pay tax means a loss of their
profit.
From those evidence, it can be seen that taxpayers
in different countries have distinctive behaviour embedded. Then it can be derived a question, what
challenges in designing personal income taxes effectively? Therefore, this article aims to examine
the main obstacles in designing individual’s income
tax systems in general and particularly to observe
taxpayers’ behaviour in developing countries. Taxpayer’s primary here refers to individual’s perception of fairness and their motivation to comply with
tax systems. This article is structured into two main
sections: One is assessing the perception of fairness in personal income tax design in reducing the
taxation income gap and two analysing the motivation to comply with paying tax in powerful personal
tax income systems

tries, these nations face many barriers from ability
to impose tax revenue systems, either from their
residents or non-residents. Lewis (1978) found that
income contributed the behaviour of taxpayers in
their compliance. This motivation to comply or not to
comply are determined by social norms and the perceptions toward these norms such as the perception of fairness and tax morals (Kirchler 2009). In
another perspective, European Commission issued
a report associated with difficulties confronted in
the less industries nations from domestic and international factors (COM 2010). In inside countries, developing countries have large informal sectors such
as in agricultures and unregistered self-employed
and irregular workers, narrow tax bases, instability of macro-economy and political, less capability of tax policy and tax administration. Moreover,
the increasing number of economic integration and
globalisation have contributed to barrier in taxing
revenue. This factor also needs to be considered to
determine attitudes of taxpayers toward tax compliance.

2. Literature Review
Designing personal income tax system is a matter of tax base and tax rate schedules. Finding
an ideal formulation are still remaining discussion
from the part to the presents. Vickrey (1945), Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976), Gordon &
Kopczuk (2014) have been concerned about tax
bases. Vickrey (1945) and Mirrlees (1971) found
that the ideal tax base was based on earning abilities. Also, Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976) also argued
that labour income required to be included in tax
base calculation. While, Gordon & Kopczuk (2014)
examines the labour income trade-off between partners. However, taxing income is not merely about
formulation between plain calculation of tax base
and tax rate but also other factors embedded in this
model.
Other factors could be identified from ability to pay
in particular individual revenues as such explained
by Smith (1976). When looking at developing coun-

3. Method
In examining and analysis this article, qualitative
method is utilised to provide better understanding in answering research question regarding challenges in developing an effective policy model on
personal income taxes. Studies on tax design and
tax behaviour have been undertaken by various researchers. In developing countries particularly, in
remaining less. In this article, therefore, tends to
focus on low-middle income countries cases. By
using qualitative methods, there are six stages to
conclude the results (Bryman 2014). It is begun
with determining research questions, finding relevant subjects, collecting and interpreting evidence,
conceptual framework and writing the finding also
conclusion.
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4. Result and Analysis
4.1. The Perception of Fairness
The perception of fairness can be deemed as one of
the main challenges when creating an effective personal income tax. This understanding likely leads
to individual’s self-awareness in the society to comply with the tax systems. Smith (1976) points out
that the consideration in determining the equity of
tax burden is divided into two aspects, horizontal
and vertical views. In horizontal view, people who
have the same taxable capacity are taxed with the
same tax burden, while in vertical perspective, individual who has higher capacity pays higher tax
burden. However, it remains critical that individual
who earns about 40 million in two months but irregular income and person who regularly makes money
until reach around 40 million in ten years would be
unfair to be taxed the same amount even though
they have the same taxable income. However, if the
lifetime of individual is accounted for the total of tax
liabilities, this is harsh to calculate a reliable measurement of the lifetime. Spicer & Becker (1980)
discover that in the same tax rate, people who perceive tax as an advantage in the fiscal circumstance
tend to have higher compliance than those who see
it as a disadvantage.
The judgment of fairness depends on the degree
of individual choices on individual’s situation. Le
Grand (1989) found that people who might have the
same job with different income or status have different opportunity related to taxable liability as well
as the attitude towards income tax. In the progressive tax rate, the higher income can be assumed to
pay higher tax rate; presumably, it generates more
revenue for the government. However, in the perspective of taxpayers, people who have higher income tend to work harder and deprive their leisure
time compare with other taxpayers with lower income. Their income is lower because they tend to
work less and spend their time with family. This
case needs to be criticised. The unfairness of that
situation is likely to influence the individual when
deciding whether to avoid or evade taxes. Calderwood & Webley (1992) discover that entrepreneur
and self-employed are hard-working and ambitious.
When tax rates are increased, they tend to comply
less with the tax authorities since it reduces their
income significantly. While in the case of less oppor-
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tunity to avoid, Loewenstein & Issacharoff (1994)
find that self-employed become less hard-working.
It can be argued that higher tax rate may discourage
people to work as well as being honest to comply.
Individual tax perception in fairness also tends to be
influenced by their satisfaction towards their government. The government could be seen as providing
services to the society. A study conducted by Kirchler (1997) examines that Australian taxpayers argue
that government needs to spend more public fund
on education, public health, science and research
as well as on preserving art, culture or military defense. Brazil, as an illustration, has implemented
effective policies that emphasize more tax spending
on education, health and cash transfer to approximately 25% of poor households. This policy can
reduce inequality up to roughly five points as well
as create more jobs which lead to more tax revenue.
The satisfaction of services provided by government
could determine the relationship between government or tax authorities and taxpayers as ’cops and
robbers’ or ’service and client’ approach. Andrews
(2003) suggests that governments should be aware
of the existence of society as customers. Building
trust with customers or citizens such providing the
best services to client needs to be considered in
gaining the perception of fairness between various levels of taxpayers. In contrast, Kirchler (2009)
views that in command and control approach, individual is seen as self-interest maximization who
tend to avoid and evade tax as higher as possible.
The relationship between tax authorities can be
developed through another fairness area, such as
procedural justice. Wallschutzky (1984) identifies
that the perception of procedural justice can be affected by the interaction between tax officers and
taxpayers such as the time spent to pay tax and
the effort needed to pay as well as the treatments
for it. However, Sheffrin (2013) argues that procedural justices not only concern about the output of
tax policies but also the engagement of taxpayers
in designing tax systems. For ensuring taxpayers’
compliance, the voice of every part of societies
needs to be considered in determining the best approach to increase the dignity of citizens. In the
case of low and lower-middle-income countries, the
approach of procedural justice seems to provide an
opportunity to tax employees in the informal sector with a low level of compliance. OECD (2015)
reported that 59.6% of 114.6 million Indonesians’
are workers of informal sectors. If the informal sec-
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tors can be involved in designing personal income
tax and can be treated respectfully, the existence
of informal sectors can generate more revenue for
governments.
An individual’s view of fairness is differently related
to the attitude towards tax liability. Strümpel (1966)
posits that the level of individual’s compliance can
be affected by their behaviour and perception towards tax system the understanding of equality in
the tax regime. As a consequence, the fairness of
tax systems perceives by societies tends to affect
the way of thinking about inequality of income. According to Lymer & Oats (2015), a tax is enacted as
the source of funding for four primary purposes. The
aims are economic stability, regulatory objective, increasing the quality of human life and delivering
public goods. If personal income tax proportion to
GDP is small, it could not provide significant impact
to society because the lower level of compliance
means that it could not cover government spending and the general goal could not be achieved.
Therefore, income tax from an individual can give
excellent opportunities to generate public revenue
as well as increase equality.

4.2. Motivation to comply
Another critical challenge when developing tax system is the motivation of taxpayers to comply with
tax regimes. According to Bărbuţămişu (2011), the
conformity behaviour of taxpayers is influenced by
economic and non-economic factors. The economic
factor consists of the level of actual income, tax
rates, tax benefits, penalties, tax audits, fines and
audit probability. The non-economic factor includes
attitude toward tax, personal, social and national
norms, and perceived fairness of tax system. There
are also some other components that affect taxpayer compliance, namely confidentiality (Laury
& Wallace, 2005), social behaviour and enforcement (Davis, Hecth & Perkins, 2003). A government
needs to realize that the economic factor in the form
of financial incentives such as tax rate, penalty and
administration fines should not be considered as
the primary focus to make taxpayer comply with
the tax obligation. Although the government has the
legitimacy to encourage their citizens to fulfill its tax
compliance, taxpayers should have the opportunity
to manage their compliance. Therefore, motivation
to comply needs to be considered when designing

C HALLENGES

IN

D ESIGNING ...

63

fiscal policy as well as tax moral of societies, which
is translated into intrinsic motivation.
In a tax morale perspective, research indicates that
there is a high correlation between tax compliance
and tax morale in both industrialized and developing countries (OECD 2013). According to Torgler &
Schneider (2009), morale is an individual intrinsic
motivation which is a voluntary act to obey and pay
tax for the sake of a successful country’s development. When each taxpayer has a good morale in
complying with the tax system, it is likely to improve
tax revenue as well as other objectives of fiscal
policy, such as enough sources of public spending. Tax morale can be explained as a condition
where the taxpayer is honest in paying taxes. While
tax compliance can be defined as a state where a
taxpayer has already complied with all of the taxpaying requirements. There are a few aspects that
affect tax morale according to Feld & Frey (2002).
Firstly, there is a perception of honesty. Secondly,
tax authority’s helpfulness with regards to meeting with the tax regulation. Then the high level of
trust in government and mutual respect between
the taxpayer and tax officials.
The socioeconomic perspective needs to be considered in drawing better pictures of the real condition
on individual taxpayers. A better understanding of
the subject leads to superior strategy in designing
tax systems as well as in increasing the number of
tax compliance. There are also several factors influencing tax moral such as support for democracy,
age, trust in government, female, religious and education degree. In Asia, for instance, the confidence
of citizens in the government have a significant impact on the tax morale of the taxpayers (OECD
2013). As a consequence, individual tends to evade
or avoid tax systems since there is no trust in the
government. Furthermore, when the level of taxpayer’s trust and confidence increases, it may lead
to an excellent tax compliance. The high degree of
reliance towards tax official, such as shown by Austria and Switzerland taxpayers, is mainly caused
by an effective tax regulation and system execute
by honest and professional tax officials. It is identified by Torgler & Schneider (2005); morale factor
has a significant influence on the tax compliance
factor in Austria. The morale factor comes from the
existence of trust and pride variable toward tax authority. Moreover, this factor becomes a crucial and
a significant factor for Austria to shape a better tax
compliance for a taxpayer. Therefore, a mutual rela-

Economics and Finance in Indonesia Vol. 62 No. 1, April 2016, pp. 59–66

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016

5

Economics and Finance in Indonesia, Vol. 62 [2016], No. 1, Art. 5

64

R AENI & S ARI , A/W HAT

ARE THE

C HALLENGES

IN

D ESIGNING ...

tionship between government, tax authority and taxpayer need to be maintained and flourished through
an efficient and well-performed action as well as
creating a positive social atmosphere.

that tax morale plays a crucial role in accordance
behaviour such as in Australia, which enacted a voluntary respect and self-assessment in paying tax,
and taxpayers tend to comply with the regulation.

In our society, there is a social pattern where a
group of people will likely to abide any social norm
as long as they believe that the other groups are
also complying with it, and vice versa. Incompliance
behaviour performed by an individual will affect others because that kind of action will create an opportunistic behaviour in a disadvantage way such
as tax evasion. This type of opportunistic behaviour
tends to arise when there is a weak undetected
supervision by the tax authority.

Tax morale is an intrinsic part of the motivation to deliver while there are other factors, which determine
tax compliance of personal income tax. According
to Alm & Torgler (2011) analyse, the taxpayer is motivated to meet the tax obligation only because of
the fear of getting penalties, tax fines, tax inspection
and tax rates. The aversion towards individual’s risk
seems to be dissimilar. Braithwaite, Murphy & Reinhart (2007) examine that there are five elements
of motivation; commitment, capitulation, resistance,
disengagement and game playing.

When fraud keeps being committed by the taxpayer
and is seen as "typical conduct" in a tax system,
the tax morale and compliance will perform poorly.
Another example is the self-employed citizens who
tend to have lower tax morale than full-time employees. The opportunity for full-time employees
to not to comply with tax regulation is limited as
the income is deducted by their employer. However,
tax morale related to self-employed is not always
the same since Strümpel (1969) found that the tax
morale in England was relatively high while in other
European countries had a lower level of tax morale.
Although, when the German government enacted
a coercive tax enforcement law, the tax morale of
the citizen was also comparatively small, while in
England, the government focused on giving more
attention and respect to societies rather that taking
an active control.
A type of tax policy for the purpose of increasing the
tax morale between one country to another seems
to be different depending on the type of taxpayers’
characteristics. Tax morale is not an independent
factor and might be driven by the environment in
which the taxpayers live. For illustration, a tax that
is collected by religious institution as obligatory tax,
but there is no significant enforcement, this tax has
a significant tax compliance (Dwenger et al. 2014).
In contrast, Luttmer & Singhal (2014) examine that
in a country with strict enforcement, tax morale is
seen as an important aspect of society. While a
country with a lack of law enforcement, tax compliance may not be deemed necessary. When an individual has a self-awareness to comply, they might
feel ashamed if they do not pay taxes. It happened
in Australia where tax compliance become a voluntary obedience. Torgler & Murphy (2004) find out

Commitment occurs when taxpayers are willingly
want to fully involved in understanding the system,
benefits, procedure, vision and mission of the regulated tax regime. In the capitulation element, there
is no level of involvement to the tax authority and
taxpayers comply to pay all of their taxes such as
income tax, corporate tax and consumption tax.
When taxpayers experience an injustice system
such as unfair income tax, they will confront openly
to the tax authority. This kind of action is the resistance element. For the disengagement and gameplaying elements, it will be executed by the taxpayer
when there is no trust factor between them. For
instance, when tax authority is seen to be applying
unfair tax system (tax rates, penalties and fines, tax
benefits) or worse tax authority conducting criminal
tax activity (corruption), then the disengagement
element occurs where the taxpayer will separate
psychologically with tax administration. Another situation, for example, is when taxpayers are aware that
they can cooperate with the tax authority into doing
criminally act manipulate the tax system, then this
kind of practices constitutes as the game-playing
element.
Motivational attitudes could also be seen as a social
signal sent by the taxpayer to the tax authorities as
a social communication tool to identify the social
distance between the taxpayer and fiscal officers.
The social signal is created by using the social
distance between the taxpayers and the tax authorities (Kirchler 2009). When tax authorities could not
understand and would not pay attention to the demands made by taxpayers, it ultimately causes the
taxpayer to be ignorance and fearless of complying with tax liability. The effectiveness of tax reg-
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ulations can be seen through the social distance
condition. When the distance is getting further, it
shows that the tax rules are still not suitable and
representative to the taxpayer’s interest regarding
fair tax collection, reasonable tax rates, and the
simplicity of tax collection procedures. According to
Braithwaite (2003), the social distance created by
the taxpayer and tax authority can be identified by
using the motivational posture. The social distance
explains the influence position between the tax administrators and the taxpayers. When the distance
is widening, it means that the tax authority did not
understand or giving enough attention to the demand and interest of the taxpayers on matters such
as unfair and unsuitable tax rates, tax benefits, or
any consequences that taxpayer experienced will
lead to a higher social distance. Consequently, the
taxpayer will not comply and show disobedience to
the tax authority and its regulation. Therefore, the
success of the relationship between taxpayer and
tax administration can be seen through the social
distance.
When a good mutual relationship between the taxpayer and tax authority existed, it consequently will
give a solution to cope with the issue of social distance. Synchronising the taxpayer’s interest in the
tax authority’s interest and its taxation regulation will
create a harmonise relationship. Therefore, trust,
pride, respectful, fair, professional and liable in taxpayer and tax officials need to be strengthened. In
return, the motivational posture factor of commitment and capitalization will improve and will create
adequate tax compliance. It can be identified that
taxpayer’s compliance is not based only on economic factors but also non-economic factors such
as motivation, social norm and etiquette. As previously mentioned, the motivational posture factor
plays a crucial role in shaping tax compliance and
relationship between taxpayer and tax authority.

5. Conclusion
Based on the analyses above, tax behaviour, which
comprises the perception of fairness and motivation
to comply, attracts urgent challenges in designing effective tax on personal income in every country and
mainly underdeveloped countries. Personal income
tax system can be seen as powerful policy when
achieving the objectives of tax on individual income,
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such as the source of revenue for public spending
with high compliance rate as well as distribute income to societies. However, the best design would
be ineffective without considering the subject. Every human being in each country has their social
pattern towards tax policy. When the individual perception of fairness is significant, it will harmonize
the ’client and service approach’ between taxpayers
and governments. This condition would influence
tax morale of individuals to comply with the policy
and achieve high compliance rate. Therefore, this
article has argued that personal view of fairness
and their motivation to comply with tax systems
are becoming vital challenges in designing the tax
policy on individual income.
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